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ABSTRACT 
Over the last decade, there has been a rise in cybercrime services offered on a fee-
for-service basis, enabling individuals to direct attacks against various targets. 
One of the recent services offered involves stresser or booter operators, 
which offer distributed reflected denial of service (DRDoS) attacks on an hourly 
or subscription basis. These attacks involve the use of malicious traffic reflected 
off of webservers to increase the volume of traffic, which is directed toward 
websites and servers rendering them unusable. Researchers have examined 
DRDoS attacks using real-time data, though few have considered the experience 
of their customers and the factors associated with the likelihood of successful 
attack outcomes. This study examines this issue using a binary logistic regression 
analysis of survey responses from a population of stresser clients. The 
implications of this study for our understanding of the social factors 
underlying cyberattacks is discussed in depth. 
Keywords: DRDoS, cybercrime, booter operators, malicious traffic, 
logistic regression 
1. INTRODUCTION
Over the last decade, the landscape of 
cybercrime has changed as a result of the 
establishment of tools that enable attacks to be 
performed on a fee-for-service basis.  There are 
myriad studies demonstrating the range of 
services available in underground cybercrime 
markets, ranging from spam email distribution 
to malicious software to personal information 
and credit card data (Dhanjani & Rios, 2008; 
Franklin, Paxson, Perrig, & Savage, 2007; 
Herley & Florencio, 2010; Holt, 2013; Holt & 
Lampke, 2010; Holz, Engelberth, & Freling, 
2009; Honeynet Research Alliance, 2003; 
Motoyama, McCoy, Levchenko, Savage, & 
Voelker, 2011; Thomas & Martin, 2006).  
Service providers readily earn millions of 
dollars selling attack tools or personal 
information due to the demand from interested 
parties looking to quickly and efficiently target 
individuals and corporations alike (Franklin et 
al., 2007; Holt, Smirnova, & Chua, 2016; Holz 
et al., 2009; Moore, Clayton, & Anderson, 
2009).  
 Research on cybercrime services 
demonstrates that they are largely driven by 
social relationships between buyers and sellers, 
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whether they operate in forums (Holt, 2013; 
Holt & Lampke, 2010; Holt et al., 2016; 
Motoyama et al., 2011; Yip, Webber & 
Shadbolt, 2013), IRC (Franklin et al., 2006; 
Honeynet Research Alliance, 2003; Holz et al., 
2009), or on sites hosted on Tor, or the Dark 
Web (Li & Chen, 2014; Smirnova & Holt, 
2017).  Specifically, buyers frequently post 
reviews of their experience with a vendor, with 
an emphasis on the quality of products relative 
to their costs, and the speed with which vendors 
respond to queries (e.g., Holt, 2013; Holt & 
Lampke, 2010; Hutchings & Holt, 2015).  The 
tone of feedback has a strong influence on the 
perceived reputation of vendors, with negative 
feedback minimizing their ability to sell within 
a given market (Franklin et al., 2007; Herley & 
Florencio, 2010; Holt & Lampke, 2010; 
Motoyama et al., 2011).  In fact, some forums 
offer product testers who actively evaluate the 
claims of vendors’ tools or data and post their 
reviews to help legitimize quality vendors and 
marginalize those offering poor quality goods 
(Holt et al., 2016).   
 The need to purchase functional data and 
effective services are somewhat obvious: buyers 
seek the greatest value and return on their initial 
investment (e.g., Smirnova & Holt, 2017).  This 
is particularly critical when considering stolen 
financial information or malicious software that 
acquires sensitive data or provides backdoor 
remote access to victim machines.  In the event 
the data or service does not work, the buyer will 
have minimal recourse to recoup their losses.  
Other forms of cybercrime-as-service attacks 
may not be as dependent upon this dynamic, 
particularly if the only goal of the attack is to 
shut down access to a resource.  This is 
frequently the case with so-called "stresser" or 
"booter" services that offer distributed reflective 
denial of service (DRDoS) attacks for a fee 
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016; Karimi & McCoy, 
2013; Rossow & Gurtz, 2014; Santanna, 
Rijswijk-Deij, Hofstede, & Sperotto, 2015).   
These attacks enable service providers to 
perform high- volume Distributed Denial of 
Service attacks against web-based targets with 
minimal resources, while simultaneously hiding 
the origin of the attacks.  During an attack, the 
target is flooded with more requests than can be 
completed in millisecond intervals by using 
vulnerable servers and devices such as home 
routers to reflect and amplify the volume of 
requests during the attacks. Since the target 
cannot respond to the attack requests, legitimate 
users are also unable to utilize the resource as 
well.  DRDoS attacks can cost companies 
millions of dollars in lost revenue and may 
embarrass the victim as well due to perceptions 
over their inability to stop the attack (e.g., Arbor 
Networks, 2015).  
 The fee-for-service model of booters and 
stressers primarily operate on a subscription 
basis, where customers pay for weeks or months 
of service during which they can launch attacks 
at will (Arbor Networks 2016; Hutchings & 
Clayton, 2016; Karimi, Park, & McCoy, 2015; 
Rossow & Gortz, 2014; Santanna et al., 2015).  
Customers are also given options as to the type 
of attack that will be performed on the basis of 
specific Internet protocol vulnerabilities that can 
be used to send requests.  Though the attack type 
may vary, the primary outcome of the attack is 
the same: keeping others from using a web 
server or on-line resource.  As a consequence, 
booter clients may not be interested in the 
accuracy with which an attack takes place, but 
whether the service is made unavailable.   
 Though research examining booters and 
stressers has increased (Hutchings & Clayton 
2016; Karimi & McCoy, 2013; Karimi et al., 
2015; Rossow & Gortz, 2014; Santanna et al., 
2015), few have considered whether their 
customers were satisfied with the service or 
achieved their specified goals.  Evidence 
suggests that the majority of DRDoS services 
are functional, with only a small proportion 
either failing or utilizing a different attack 
method than what was initially ordered (Karimi 
et al., 2015; Santanna et al., 2015).  Thus, this 
exploratory analysis attempted to identify the 
foreground and situational dynamics associated 
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with customers’ perceptions of failed attacks 
performed by booter and stresser service 
providers.  Using survey data collected from 
individuals who appeared to have purchased 
DRDoS service subscriptions, the findings 
demonstrate that the practices of vendors have a 
greater impact on the likelihood of failure than 
those of the customer.  The results reinforce the 
broader literature on cybercrime as a service, 
and the implications of this study for our 
understanding of cybercrimiality are considered 
in detail.   
2. PRIOR RESEARCH ON STRESSORS
AND BOOTERS 
The operation of booter and stresser services are 
somewhat different from existing DDoS attacks 
commonly associated with either botnet 
malware (Karimi & McCoy, 2013; Karimi et al., 
2015; Santanna et al., 2015) or stand-alone tools 
such as the Low Orbit Ion Cannon associated 
with Anonymous (Mansfield-Devine, 2011).  
Both DRDoS and DDoS attacks utilize 
thousands of connection requests to a targeted 
server, launched from multiple IP addresses 
every second.  Stresser services, however, do 
not launch attacks from infected computers as 
with botnets.  Instead, they utilize powerful 
backend servers to “reflect” or amplify the 
quantity of traffic to the targeted system through 
the use of malformed packets with spoofed IP 
addresses (US CERT, 2014).   
These backend servers are not controlled 
by attackers but are part of existing Internet 
service providers’ infrastructure that can be 
vulnerable to this form of attack. Certain 
network protocols can be hijacked by attackers 
as a means to send attack traffic.  In fact, fifteen 
different network protocols have been used to 
reflect and amplify attacks, most of which are 
extremely common and used by major websites 
(Rossow & Gortz, 2014; US CERT, 2014).  The 
various protocols available work to an attacker’s 
advantage, as stressor operators changed their 
attack methods in progress if they are 
unsuccessful due to vendors and website 
operators patching known security flaws 
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016).    
 The flexibility afforded to stresser operators 
in terms of attack protocols would suggest they 
have a high likelihood of general success 
knocking targets off-line.  This is supported by 
recent research analyzing actual attack traffic 
against live targets (Karimi & McCoy, 2013; 
Santanna et al., 2015).  At the same time, the 
information customers need to determine what 
booter and stresser operator to work with may 
not be readily available as service providers 
typically advertise their services via personal 
websites (Hutchings & Anderson, 2016).  
Unlike with forums and other interactive 
cybercrime markets, individual websites allow 
operators to control the number of negative 
reviews or critical comments over their services 
that can be viewed (Hutchings & Anderson, 
2016; Smirnova & Holt, 2017).  These 
conditions may constrain buyer decision-
making and lead certain factors associated with 
both the vendor and the prospective buyer to be 
a strong determinant in whether an attack fails 
or succeeds.    
To that end, certain characteristics of the 
stresser or booter service provider may have 
some association to an attack failure.  For 
instance, some stresser operators offer free 
attacks using a small number of common attack 
protocols as a means for clients to validate the 
seller’s claims (Hutchings & Clayton, 2016).  
The same process has been noted in stolen data 
markets operating in forums and on-line spaces, 
though individuals who offer free data may be 
more likely to cheat their customers and provide 
no data after receiving payment from the 
customer (Herley & Florencio, 2010; Holt et al., 
2016).  All stressers do not offer free tests, 
suggesting that the availability of testing 
services may be associated with a more reliable 
stresser operator.  
In much the same way, some stresser 
operators allow their customers to test their 
service at no cost for a set period of minutes to 
validate their claims.  Tests of data or services 
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in traditional cybercrime-as-service markets 
appear to be a way to establish a vendor’s 
reliability and may be associated with higher 
prices for data (Holt, Smirnova & Chua, 2013).  
In the event a vendor does not offer a test, the 
customer takes a risk that the vendor has 
exaggerated their claims.  As a result, an 
absence of testing services may be more likely 
to increase the risk of attack failure.    
The ability to communicate with the 
vendor should also influence success as research 
demonstrates a strong connection between 
vendor communications and their overall 
reputation in cybercrime-as-service markets 
generally (Holt, 2013; Holt & Lampke, 2010; 
Yip et al., 2013).  Those who are difficult to 
contact or are slow to respond may be more 
likely to be rip-off artists or simply unconcerned 
about the potential for customer feedback to 
influence their market position.  Booter and 
stresser operators may be more open to contact 
with their clients due to the potential for attacks 
to be launched in different ways to achieve the 
same attack objective: elimination of a resource 
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016).  If an attack is 
successful on its initial launch, the customer has 
no need to contact the vendor.  Thus, attempts to 
contact stresser operators may be a predictor of 
failure as the attack may not have worked as 
advertised.   
A potential customer’s knowledge of 
booters and stressers may have a mixed 
relationship to the likelihood of a stresser 
attack’s success.  Individuals with a greater 
comprehension of the technical aspects of a 
certain form of attack and a service may be 
better able to recognize accurate descriptions of 
attacks posted by vendors. At the same time, the 
availability of tests and free attacks renders the 
need for deep technical knowledge moot as 
customers can shop across vendors until they 
find a provider that works (Franklin et al., 2007; 
Holt & Lampke, 2010).  Thus, knowledge may 
have a limited relationship to attack failure.   
The target a customer has identified for 
an attack may also have a relationship to the 
likelihood of success.  Larger organizations and 
government resources may be resilient against 
web-based DRDoS attacks because of their use 
of cloud-based security infrastructure to offload 
malicious traffic has decreased the utility of 
some forms of DDoS attacks (Graham-
Cumming, 2014).  In recent years, DRDoS 
services have also been employed against on-
line gaming servers as a way to target competing 
players and knock them off-line during play 
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016; Karami & McCoy, 
2013).  These targets may be more easily 
affected, as could individually be owned or 
operated web servers because of variations in 
their infrastructure and security configurations.   
The motivation of an attacker may also 
have some relationship to the success of an 
attack.  DDoS attacks have value as an 
expressive attack tool, as they may be used for 
either economic gain, ideological agendas, or 
simply revenge against an opponent or enemy 
(Rossow & Gortz, 2014).  Individuals seeking to 
profit from an attack may be less dependent on 
a successful attack and simply on the threat of 
an attack taking place in order to profit (Ianelli 
& Hackworth, 2005; Segura & Lahuerta, 2010).  
Individuals seeking to express an ideological 
belief may be more reliant on an attack’s success 
in order to communicate their opinion (Denning, 
2011; Woo et al., 2004).  At the same time, they 
may be interested in targeting resources that 
have more robust infrastructure and security 
tools to withstand an attack of all but the largest 
magnitude (Graham-Cumming, 2014). These 
attack types may be more likely to fail 
depending on the nature of the attack.  
Individuals seeking revenge may be more likely 
to target game servers or peers, thereby making 
them more likely to succeed.   
These hypotheses are based on 
assumptions about the nature of attackers and 
booter/stresser operators, though the research 
to-date is limited.  As a result, there is a need for 
empirical inquiry to address this gap in our 
knowledge about the nature of cybercrime-as-
service operations.  This study attempted to 
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examine these issues using a unique 
convenience sample of booter and stresser 
clientele.   
3. DATA AND METHODS 
A unique sampling methodology was employed 
to develop a sample of stresser clients for this 
analysis. While prior studies either hired booter 
services to examine attack traffic (e.g. Karimi & 
McCoy, 2013; Santanna et al., 2015) or 
contacted vendors to conduct interviews 
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016), such strategies do 
not provide insights from their customers.  We 
researchers identified a cracked database of 
stresser customers that was posted online, 
containing 51,909 unique email addresses.  This 
provided a robust sample of individuals who 
were at least interested in learning more about 
stressers, or may have used that specific service 
provider.   
These email addresses were sent a 
message inviting the recipient to participate in 
an anonymous online survey to understand 
stresser service operations between November 
27 and 29, 2016.  The email message informed 
the respondent that a research study was being 
conducted on stressers and booters, the survey 
was anonymous, and the information would 
only be used for research purposes.  The first 
question of the survey was embedded in the 
email message and if the respondent answered 
the first question, they were directed to the 
remainder of the survey on the Survey Monkey 
webpage.  The survey consisted of 22 multiple 
choice questions and one comment box for 
follow up requests.  The questions related to the 
use of stresser and booters and included the 
respondent’s skill level, type of payment used, 
attack protocols used, targets of attacks, 
motivation for usage, and demographics.  A 
reminder message was sent on December 2, 
2016, as a reminder to the complete the survey 
which closed on December 30, 2016.  
 Of the initial sample of messages sent, 5,226 
emails were verified as received and opened.  
This is sensible given the fact that the database 
containing those emails had been posted 
publicly and may have included junk email 
addresses abandoned by users.  Also, the 
researchers have no way to validate whether the 
addresses belonged to 59,000 individuals, or 
involved multiple accounts owned by a single 
person.  Of those, 821 individuals completed the 
survey, and 218 remained due to listwise 
deletion.  While this is a substantial drop-off in 
respondents, it is not outside of expectations for  
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response rates in traditional on-line survey 
studies (Curtin, Presser, & Singer, 2005; Fan & 
Zan, 2010) and in a population of active 
offenders generally.  Prior scholarship notes that 
individuals engaged in cybercrime are less 
likely to participate in research out of concern 
for their safety (e.g., Holt, 2007; Hutchings & 
Clayton, 2016; Pruitt, 2007).  Though the small 
sample limits the generalizability of the data, the 
responses provide essential insights into an 
under-examined phenomenon using a 
convenient yet purposive set of respondents.   
 
Dependent Variable 
To understand the extent to which 
stresser services worked, respondents were 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (N= 201)       
Variable   Mean  SD  Min  Max  
Did stresser not work  .233  .424  0  1 
Pay to use    .651  .477  0  1  
Could you test   .915  .278  0  1  
Contact Stresser  .323  .468  0  1 
Knowledge   7.611  2.353  1  10 
Target  
Self    .577  .495  0  1 
Game    .502  .501  0  1 
Business Server  .263  .441  0  1 
Website or Server  .527  .500  0  1 
Government Website  .164  .371  0  1 
Other     .343  .475  0  1 
Motive 
Research   .482  .500  0  1  
System Testing  .592  .492  0  1 
Affect Game or Opponent .427  .496  0  1 
Hacktivism   .228  .421  0  1 
Affect Business Competitor .114  .319  0  1 
Test My Abilities  .457  .499  0  1  
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asked: “Did the Booter or Stresser work as 
advertised?” (0-no; 1-yes).  Since the majority 
of respondents (75%) claimed the attack they 
used was functional, the item was reverse coded 
(1=no) to examine the factors associated with 
failed attacks (see Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics).  This issue is of particular interest as 
a small proportion of research demonstrates 
booter attack methods may fail (Santanna et al., 
2015).  Therefore research is needed to 
understand the extent to which attacks appear 
successful to the customer, regardless of 
whether the attack traffic matched what was 
advertised.   
Independent variables 
 Respondents were asked several questions 
regarding their experience with the use of a 
stressor or booter to identify any factors of the 
service may be associated with the likelihood of 
failure.  The broader research on data markets 
and cybercrime as service markets demonstrates 
some association between certain vendor 
behaviors and greater levels of trust or 
reliability.  These measures were included to 
understand the extent to which they may be 
associated with booter and stresser operations.  
Specifically, respondents were asked, “Did you 
pay a fee to use the booter or stresser” (0=no; 
1=yes).  This is included as stressers operate at 
no cost, and research on other forms of 
cybercrime as service that operate on a free basis 
may be less likely to be successful (Herley & 
Florencio, 2010).  Participants were also asked 
“Were you able to use the stresser or booter to 
test systems?” to understand the relationship 
between product testing and functionality 
(0=no; 1=yes).  Evidence suggests product 
testing in data markets may be associated with 
greater trust in the vendor (Holt et al., 2016), 
thus this variable was included to examine its 
ties to booter services.  A measure was also 
included to understand whether a customer had 
to contact the vendor: “Did you ever need to 
contact the operator of the booter or stresser for 
questions or help?” (0=no; 1=yes).  We 
hypothesize that vendor contact would be 
associated with an increased risk of attack 
failure as they may need to either 1) report the 
attack failed, or 2) seek an explanation as to why 
or how the attack did not succeed. Finally, a 
measure for customer knowledge was included 
as a 10 point scale (1=low; 10=high) to 
understand the extent to which more 
understanding of booter operations may be 
associated with failure.   
Six measures were included to examine 
the extent to which the target of an RDDoS 
attack may be associated with failure.  
Specifically, respondents were asked: “What 
did you use the stresser/booter on?” with six 
response categories:  1) Yourself, 2) Game, 3) 
Business Server (non website, such as Email or 
File Server), 4) Private/commercial Website / 
Webserver, 5) Govt website or web server, and 
6) Other.  A binary response was used (0=no;
1=yes) to test the hypothesis that certain targets,
such as commercial websites and government
servers may be more resilient to attack rendering
attacks more likely to fail.
Finally, a set of seven measures were 
included to examine the relationship between an 
actor’s motivation for performing an attack and 
their likelihood of failure.  Respondents were 
asked “What was the motivation behind use of 
the booter/stresser?” with seven responses: 1) 
research; 2) system testing; 3) affecting 
game/game opponent; 4) hacktivism (protest); 
5) affect business competitor; 6) test my
abilities; and 7) other.  These motivations
correspond to the broader reasons why actors
may employ either booter or stresser services
(Hutchings & Clayton, 2016), or those of the
hacker community generally (Holt & Kilger,
2012).  Each item was treated as a binary (0=no;
1=yes) and included to understand whether any
motivation corresponded to the likelihood of a
failed attack.
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4. FINDINGS 
To examine any relationship between vendor-
specific conditions, attitudes of the individual 
customer, and failed attacks, a binary logistic 
regression analysis was conducted.  
Multicollinearity did not appear to bias the 
parameter estimates as the independent 
variables were not strongly correlated with one 
another.  Additionally, the highest VIF was 
.508, while the lowest tolerance was 1.980 
suggesting no issues with multicollinearity 
generally.   
All variables were included 
simultaneously in a binary logistic regression 
model, which found that customers who were 
not able to test the stresser’s services were more 
likely to report a failed attack, reinforcing the 
literature regarding stolen data and cybercrime 
as service market vendor reliability (see Table 
2; Holt & Lampke, 2010; Holt et al., 2016).  
Additionally, customers who contacted the 
vendor were more likely to experience failure, 
supporting our hypothesis that individuals only 






Table 2: Binary Logistic Regression Model  (N= 201)       
Variable   B  S.E.  Exp(B)      
 
Pay to use    -.370  .471  .691 
Could you test   .233  .661  .107** 
Contact Stresser  1.271     .448     3.564** 
Knowledge   -.079  .087  .924 
 
Target  
Self    .044  .441  1.045 
Game    -.059  .516  .943 
Business Server  .105  .514  1.111 
Website or Server  .458  .463  1.196 
Government Website  -.438  .653  .645 
Other     .179  .436  1.196 
 
Motive 
Research   .530  .441  1.698 
System Testing  -.071  .465  .931 
Affect Game   .424  .535  1.528 
or Opponent   
Hacktivism   -1.565  .596  .209** 
Affect Business   .763  .698  2.145 
Competitor         
Test My Abilities  -.254  .413  .755  
Other    -.121  .538  .886 
Constant   .812  .814  2.253 
 
Pseudo R2   .234          
p=.05*; p=.01**;-2LL = 184.774; χ2(7) = 33.859** 
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No significant relationships were 
observed between target type and attack failure, 
suggesting that the nature of a target has little 
influence on resilience or success. With respect 
to the motivational measures, only one 
significant relationship was present: hacktivism.  
The relationship was negative, meaning those 
who were not motivated by an ideological or 
activist-related agenda were more likely to 
report failure.  This was unexpected as an 
ideologically motivated actor may be more 
likely to target a government or industry target 
(e.g. Jordan & Taylor, 2004), which may be 
more likely to withstand an attack.   
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Criminological scholarship examining the 
market for personal data and services based 
around hacking and cybercrime tools has 
increased over the last decade (Franklin et al., 
2007; Holt, 2013; Holt & Lampke, 2010; 
Motoyama et al., 2011).  These studies 
demonstrate that human factors drive 
cybercriminality, particularly reviews of service 
providers on the basis of the quality of their 
products and services (Holt et al., 2016; 
Motoyama et al., 2011).  Recent research has 
identified the emergence of a new form of fee-
for-service attack vendors offering DRDoS 
attacks, offering paid denial of service attacks 
against websites and services that are difficult to 
mitigate (Karimi & McCoy, 2013; Karimi et al., 
2015; Santanna et al., 2013).  Given that 
research has found these attacks to be largely 
successful with functionality that corresponds to 
what customers may order, it is necessary to 
consider what factors may be associated with 
failed attacks.  This study attempted to address 
this issue through an examination of customer 
experiences within a population of individuals 
who utilized stresser or booter services.   
 Using a unique survey of DRDoS customers, 
the findings demonstrate that failure appears to 
be associated with the stresser or booter operator 
rather than that of the client.  Specifically, 
customers who used vendors that did not allow 
tests of their services in advance were more 
likely to experience failed attacks.  These 
findings reflect evidence from prior research on 
illicit markets for data and malware as buyers 
who can validate a service provider’s claims 
prior to making a purchase were more likely to 
provide positive reviews and experiences 
(Herley & Florencio, 2010; Holt, 2013; Holt et 
al., 2016).   
Booter or Stresser customers who had to 
make contact with a stressor operator were also 
more likely to report failed attacks.  This finding 
supports the hypothesis that contact between 
stresser providers may be a sign of failure, 
which may partially reinforce the literature on 
illicit data markets.  Specifically, customers 
value the ability to contact vendors so as to 
ensure successful use of services or data (e.g., 
Holt, 2013; Holt & Lampke, 2010).  Unlike the 
purchase of data or malware which may require 
customers to have a degree of technical 
knowledge, it is likely that DRDoS service 
customers may simply want to know why the 
attack did not work.  This was reinforced by the 
fact that knowledge of booter services was non-
significant in the model.  As a result, the role of 
contact may be somewhat different compared to 
other forms of cybercrime-as-service. 
 Additionally, this study found only one 
association between customer target 
preferences, motivations, and the likelihood of 
attack failure. Those who were not motivated by 
hacktivism were more likely to fail, which is 
somewhat surprising given that hacktivists may 
be more inclined to target corporate or 
government infrastructure (e.g., Denning, 2010; 
Jordan & Taylor, 2004).  Such resources would 
theoretically have greater cybersecurity support 
infrastructure at their disposal to mitigate 
DRDoS attacks (Graham-Cumming, 2014).  
However, the fact that no other motivation was 
significant in the model suggests a need for 
greater research to disentangle the relationship 
between motive, targeting, and successful 
attacks (see also Hutchings & Clayton, 2016).   
JDFSL V14N2  Examining the correlates of failed DRDoS attacks 
Ó 2019 JDFSL 10 
 Taken as a whole, this study suggests that 
booter and stresser operations share some 
common dynamics to other forms of cybercrime 
operating on a fee-for-service basis.  Though 
DRDoS vendors advertise differently from 
stolen data and malware vendors (Hutchings & 
Clayton, 2016; Karami & McCoy, 2013; 
Karami et al., 2015) the likelihood that 
customers have successful experiences with 
service providers are driven by the same factors 
associated vendor behavior rather than that of 
the customer (Holt et al., 2016).  These findings 
suggest the social factors of cybercrime must be 
given equal consideration to those of the 
technical aspects of attacks (Franklin et al., 
2007; Holt & Bossler, 2016; Smirnova & Holt, 
2017; Yip et al., 2013).   
At the same time, the preliminary nature of this 
study and its limited generalizability demand 
further study to examine the customers’ of 
booter and stresser services.  Specifically, 
researchers could employ qualitative methods 
with known customers of service providers to 
more fully document how success is defined by 
clients (see also Hutchings & Clayton, 2016).  In 
addition, further study is needed to better define 
the targets of booter attacks to understand the 
location, employee size, and other conditions 
that may affect the likelihood of success.  
Finally, research is needed to better document 
the extent of customers’ technical proficiency so 
as to identify whether booters and stressers are 
servicing primarily unskilled actors or a more 
diverse population.  Such insights would be 
essential to understand why and how DRDoS 
service providers continue to thrive, as well as 
the reasons why individuals may be more 
willing to pay for this infrastructure on a fee-
basis as opposed to building their own for use at 
will.  Such insights can greatly improve our 
understanding of the social dynamics that shape 
cybercrime and identify strategies to detect, 
mitigate, and defend against these threats.   
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